oil (relative price change) and (ii) the increase in uncertainty about future prices (volatility). It should be noted that, as we discuss in the next section, although the former channel implies a symmetric effect of oil shocks, the latter implies an asymmetric effect. Therefore, a joint consideration of both channels sheds light on Hamilton's (2003) nonlinear oil shock measure: It captures overall effects, both symmetric and asymmetric, of oil price shocks.
We constructed an oil price volatility measure using daily prices of crude oil futures traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) over the period . Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, as hypothesized, oil price volatility has a negative and significant effect on future GDP growth. Second, this volatility effect becomes more significant after we control for the oil price change, indicating that both channels are potentially important. Third, both the oil price change and its volatility lose their M onetary policymakers are concerned with large price movements in the crude oil market, and Figure 1 explains why. 1 It shows that most U.S. post-World War II recessions, including the most recent 2001 recession, were preceded by sharp increases in crude oil prices. One conventional explanation is that oil price increases lower future GDP growth by raising production costs. Alternatively and complementarily, large oil price changes-either increases or decreases-may affect aggregate output adversely because they delay business investment by raising uncertainty or they induce costly sectoral resource reallocation.
In this paper, we explicitly distinguish between these two channels through which changes in oil prices affect aggregate economic Oil shocks exert influence on macroeconomic activity through various channels, many of which imply a symmetric effect. However, the effect can also be asymmetric. In particular, sharp oil price changes-either increases or decreases-may reduce aggregate output temporarily because they delay business investment by raising uncertainty or induce costly sectoral resource reallocation. Consistent with these asymmetric-effect hypotheses, the authors find that a volatility measure constructed using daily crude oil futures prices has a negative and significant effect on future gross domestic product (GDP) growth over the period . Moreover, the effect becomes more significant after oil price changes are also included in the regression to control for the symmetric effect. The evidence here provides economic rationales for Hamilton's (2003) nonlinear oil shock measure: It captures overall effects, both symmetric and asymmetric, of oil price shocks on output.
significance after we control for Hamilton's (2003) nonlinear oil shock measure. This result confirms that Hamilton's measure captures the overall effects of oil shocks on aggregate output and, therefore, cannot be entirely attributed to data mining, as suggested by Hooker (1996a,b) .
It is also important to note that, consistent with work by Hamilton (1983 and 1985) and others, a vast majority of the largest daily oil futures price changes in our data are associated with exogenous events such as wars or political instability in the Middle East. Moreover, the dynamic of the oil price volatility measure cannot be explained by standard macroeconomic variables. This evidence is consistent with a causal interpretation of the macroeconomic effect of oil shocks. 2 As a robustness check, we measured volatility also using squared quarterly oil price changes over a longer sample, 1947-2004 , and obtained very similar results. For example, oil price volatility has a negative and (marginally) significant effect on future GDP growth when combined with oil price changes, which are statistically significant as well. Again, both variables lose their predictive power after we control for Hamilton's (2003) nonlinear oil shock measure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After providing a brief summary of the relation between oil prices and output, we discuss our measure of realized variance of oil futures prices. We then investigate the relation between realized variance of oil futures prices and various measures of macroeconomic activity. Hamilton (1983) , among many others, has documented a negative and significant relation between oil price changes and future GDP growth. This result, however, breaks down in data after 1986 (e.g., Hooker, 1996a) . The unstable relation possibly reflects that Hamilton has implicitly assumed a symmetric effect of oil shocks in his linear specification: An increase (decrease) in oil prices reduces (increases) future GDP growth. This specification is consistent with some transmission channels (e.g., Rasche and Tatom, 1977a,b; Baily, 1981; and Wei, 2003) through which oil shocks exert influence on macroeconomic activity. 3 However, the effect can be also asymmetric: An oil price decrease may actually lower future GDP growth through other channels. In particular, as we investigate in this paper, a sharp oil price change-either increase or decrease-affects the macroeconomy adversely for at least two reasons. First, it raises uncertainty about future oil prices and thus causes delays in business investment (e.g., Bernanke, 1983, and Pindyck, 1991) . Second, it induces resource reallocation, for example, from more adversely influenced sectors to less adversely influenced sectors, and such reallocation is costly (e.g., Lilien, 1982, and Hamilton, 1988) . Overall, whereas an oil price increase has a negative effect on future GDP growth, the effect of an oil price decrease is ambiguous. That is, given that both the oil price change and volatility are related to future GDP growth, Hamilton's (1983) specification suffers from an omitted variables problem.
RELATED LITERATURE
As shown in Figure 1 , this explanation of the omitted variables problem is plausible. Most oil price changes are positive before 1986; in contrast, oil prices exhibit larger swings in both directions afterward. As a result, although Hamilton's (1983) linear specification is a good approximation before 1986, it is not after 1986 because of the increased importance of nonlinearity induced by large negative oil price changes.
To take into account the asymmetric effect, Hamilton (1996 and proposed a transformation of raw oil prices. In particular, an oil shock is equal to the difference between the current oil price and the maximum price in the past 4 or 12 quarters if the difference is positive and is equal to zero otherwise. Hamilton found that the transformed oil shock measure exhibits a negative and stable relation with future GDP growth. Figure 2 illustrates his results by showing that a positive oil shock measured using a 12-quarter 2 Barsky and Kilian (2004) , however, have argued that causality runs from macroeconomic variables to oil prices. horizon proceeds almost all the recessions in the post-World War II sample. Nevertheless, it is important to verify that Hamilton's measure of oil shocks indeed captures the nonlinear relation between oil prices and real GDP growth; otherwise, it is vulnerable to the criticism of data mining (Hooker, 1996b) . That is, if the change and volatility of crude oil prices have distinct effects on the macroeconomy, these effects should be related to or even subsumed by Hamilton's modified oil shock measure. This is the main focus of our paper.
REALIZED OIL PRICE VARIANCE
We measured uncertainty about oil prices using a realized oil price variance series constructed from daily crude oil futures prices obtained from the NYMEX. In particular, as in Merton (1980) and Figure 2 Hamilton's Oil Shocks Measured Using a 12-Quarter Horizon Andersen et al. (2003) , among others, quarterly realized oil price variance, RV_O, is the sum of squared daily price changes in a quarter:
( 1) where RET_O d is the change in daily futures prices in day d of quarter t. 4 Realized variance of other frequencies (e.g., a month) is defined in a similar manner. Increased volatility in the prices of 1-month futures contracts probably reflects that the market is more vulnerable to temporary disruptions in supply stemming from strikes, refinery shut-downs, or unexpected changes in inventories. These high-frequency shocks mainly reflect transitory noises, which are unlikely to have any significant effect on investors' perceptions about the uncertainty of future oil prices. Therefore, we focused on the volatility measure using 12-month futures contracts in our empirical analysis; nevertheless, we found qualitatively the same results using futures contracts of different maturities.
Figure 4 also shows that oil price volatility increased dramatically in 1986 and 1990, with the former episode reflecting a steep decline in oil prices and the latter a sharp increase because of the first Gulf War (see Figure 1 ). However, volatility stays at a relatively low level after the first Gulf War, although oil prices continue to exhibit large swings (see Figure 1 ). We did not observe any large spikes in realized volatility after 1990, even during the second Gulf War in 
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4 The volatility measure defined in equation (1) seems to be plausible because changes in daily crude oil futures prices have a sample average close to zero and negligible serial correlation. We found very similar results using various alternative specifications-for example, using the average daily return in a quarter as a proxy for the conditional return or controlling for serial correlation. 5 The 12-month contract is the contract with the most distant maturity and for which daily prices are reliably available since 1984. after 1990, but we were unable to make any formal inference because of the small number of observations. Many authors (e.g., Guo, 2002) have shown that stock market volatility also has an adverse effects on aggregate output. Given that stock market prices are equal to discounted future cash flows, oil price volatility might be closely related to stock market volatility. To investigate whether these two volatility measures have similar forecasting power for GDP growth, we also constructed quarterly realized stock market variance, RV_S, using daily stock return data (obtained from Kenneth French at Dartmouth College) 6 : Interestingly, oil price volatility is at least as high as stock market volatility, but the timing of the spikes generally do not coincide. The correlation coefficient between the two volatility measures is a modest 7 percent.
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WHAT EXPLAINS OIL PRICE VOLATILITY?
Unanticipated economic developments could, in principle, roil crude oil markets and increase volatility. Recent examples include the unexpected surge in energy demand from China and India, which helped to draw down worldwide buffer stocks, and the decline in the tradeweighted value of the U.
S. dollar. According to the International Monetary Fund's April 2004 World Economic Outlook,
This decline in commercial stocks and concerns about low U.S. gasoline inventories resulted in a noticeable increase in the volatility of oil prices and the average price of crude oil. A build up of large long speculative positions in futures markets also contributed to the increase in spot prices. (pp. 54-55) Another cause of increased uncertainty could reflect exogenous events that are noneconomic in nature. 7 Hamilton (1985) shows that several of the principal causes of increases in crude oil prices from 1947 to 1981 were labor strikes, political disturbances such as the Iranian revolution or the Suez Canal crisis, and wars. In practice, there are two methods that can be used to test whether economic developments or noneconomic developments are the principle cause of increased oil price volatility. Table 1 reports the first method, a narrative approach that relates Wall Street Journal news accounts with the 10 largest daily price movements of the 12-month futures contracts over the period April 1983 -December 2004 Most of the events associated with the largest percentage changes are related to developments among the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or political instabilities in the Middle East. Interestingly, among the 10 largest price changes, half occurred during 1986, when crude oil prices plunged. We also found similar results using the next 40 largest price movements (which are available upon request). We confirmed Hamilton's results using higherfrequency data.
The second method relies on formal statistical tests. Table 2 measures whether standard macrovariables forecast one-quarter-ahead realized oil futures variance. The predictive variables include past realized oil variance, RV_O ; the oil price change, RET_O ; realized stock market variance, RV_S; stock market return, RET_S; the default premium, DEF; the term premium, TERM; and the growth rate of real GDP, D_GDP. The default premium is the difference between the yield on Baa-and Aaa-rated corporate bonds, and the term premium is the difference between the yield on 10-year Treasury notes and 3-month Treasury bills. A sizable literature suggests that yield spreads like these contain valuable information about current and prospective business conditions (e.g., see Dueker, 1997 , and the references therein).
In Table 2 (row 1 of Panel A), realized oil price variance is strongly autocorrelated; the size of the coefficient is 0.565. This result is consistent with those obtained from the other financial markets, such as the stock market, where volatility tends to persist at a high level after it rises (e.g., see Guo, 2002 , and references therein). Interestingly, real GDP growth (D_GDP ) is negativelyand significantly-related to realized oil price variance. However, as shown in Panel B of Table 2 , it loses its predictive power after we add the lagged dependent variable to the regression. The other macrovariables, however, are not related to oil 8 We find similar results using futures contracts of different maturities. The independent variables are RV_O, past realized oil variance; RET_O, the oil price change; RV_S, realized stock market variance; RET_S, stock market return; DEF, the default premium; TERM, the term premium; D_GDP, the growth rate of real GDP.
price volatility in either panel. 9 Therefore, our results are consistent with the evidence in Table 1 that oil price volatility originates mainly from exogenous shocks to the U.S. economy rather than endogenous responses to these shocks.
OIL PRICE VOLATILITY AND GDP GROWTH
As the previous discussion makes clear, increases in the relative price of crude oil tend to have negative effects on output and employment, because the increases act as a tax on consumption. Moreover, because firms also face higher costs, increases in oil prices also tend to increase inflation. 10 In this section we test whether oil price volatility also has negative effects on output and, in particular, whether uncertainty causes a delay in business investment, as mentioned previously. We addressed this issue by investigating whether realized oil price variance (R_VO) forecasts onequarter-ahead real GDP growth; our results are reported in Table 3 .
Row 1 of Table 3 shows that oil price variance does have a significantly negative effect, even after we controlled for past GDP growth. Stock and Watson (2003) , among many others, show that many macroeconomic variables help forecast real GDP growth. To address this issue, we investigated the possibility that realized oil price variance forecasts real GDP growth merely because of its co-movement with the macroeconomic variables used in Table 2 . We found that, although stock market returns (row 3) and volatility (row 2) are marginally significant, they do not significantly diminish the usefulness of realized oil price variance to forecast real GDP growth. Similarly, the default premium (row 4) and the term spread (row 5) do not reduce the significance of realized oil price variance to help forecast one-quarterahead real GDP growth.
GRANGER CAUSALITY TESTS
To formally address whether oil price uncertainty has a significant effect on output, we also conducted Granger causality tests (as in Hamilton, 1983 Hamilton, , 1996 Hamilton, , and 2003 and report the results in Table 4 . In particular, we regressed real GDP growth on its own lags and lagged realized oil price variances as well as the other variables. If realized oil price variance has no effect on output,
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N OV E M B E R / D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 5 6 7 7 Table 2 . 9 The growth of fixed nonresidential business investment also forecasts oil price volatility but loses the predictive power after we control for the lagged dependent variable. Moreover, changes in the federal funds rate target, a measure of monetary policy, have negligible forecasting power for realized oil price variance. These results are available upon request. we should expect that its lags jointly have no explanatory power for real GDP growth. We tested this hypothesis using the Wald test, which has a χ 2 distribution with the degrees of freedom equal to the number of lags. Unless otherwise indicated, we chose the number of lags (which is two in our sample) using the Akaike information criterion (AIC); however, we found qualitatively the same results using four lags, as in Hamilton (1983 Hamilton ( , 1996 Hamilton ( , and 2003 .
In Panel A of Table 4 , we included two lags of the realized oil price variance and the lagged dependent variable in the forecasting equation. Consistent with the results reported in Table 3 , the one-quarter-lagged realized oil price variance is significantly negative; however, the two-quarterlagged realized variance is actually positive, although statistically insignificant. Overall, the Wald test indicates that realized oil price variance has a marginally significant effect, with a p-value of 6 percent.
We also included raw oil price changes (RET_O) in the forecasting equation and report the results in Panel B of Table 4 . In this specification, we explicitly considered two distinct effects of oil price changes on output and expect that both RV_O and RET_O have negative effects. Interestingly, the Wald test indicates that the overall effect of realized oil price variance becomes significant at the 1 percent level. The sum of coefficients of lagged RET_O is also negative, as expected; however, it is not statistically significant. Our results indicate that both channels might be important, because we uncovered more significant results when including both the oil price and its variance in the forecasting equation. As we show below, the coefficients on RET_O are not by themselves statistically significant, possibly because of the relatively small number of observations. In Panel C of Table 4 , we also include Hamilton's (2003) transformed oil price measure, MAX_RET_O, with a 12-quarter horizon. It is negative and significant at the 1 percent level; moreover, it subsumes the information content of both the oil price change (RET_O) and its volatility (RV_O). This result provides support that Hamilton's specification captures overall effects of oil prices on aggregate output and, therefore, its forecasting abilities cannot be entirely attributed to data mining.
To check for robustness, we also analyzed monthly data for industrial production growth and report the results in Panel D of Table 4 . Consistent with quarterly data, realized oil price variance is highly significant but the oil price change is not. 11 With only 20 years of observations, we were concerned that the results might be sample specific. To address this issue, we also used a longer sample, originally analyzed by Hamilton (2003) , and updated the data through 2004. We used the squared oil price change as a proxy for oil price volatility and report the results in Table 5 . Oil price variance by itself is not significant (χ 2 test statistic in Panel A) at the 10 percent level; however, it becomes marginally significant when combined with the change in oil prices, RET_O, which itself is highly significant (Panel B). Therefore, over the longer sample, we found that both channels through which oil prices affect the macroeconomy are important. Again, as shown in Panel C, both variables lose their forecasting power after we control for MAX_RET_O, which itself is highly significant.
OIL PRICE VOLATILITY, INVESTMENT, AND EMPLOYMENT
As discussed previously, the delay hypothesis suggests that oil price volatility can affect output mainly because it deters business investment in capital goods, especially those with longer-service lives. 12 Moreover, since employment growth tends to be highly dependent on output growth, a corollary to this hypothesis is that increases in oil price volatility decrease employment growth and increase the unemployment rate. Our results in Table 6 are generally consistent with this hypothesis. 11 This finding is consistent with the results by Federer (1996) , who found that oil price volatility improves forecasts of industrial production at a monthly frequency. 12 More formally, if an investment is irreversible, increased uncertainty raises the option value of waiting to invest. See Bernanke (1983) , Pindyck (1991) , and Hubbard (1998). N OV E M B E R / D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 5 6 8 1 
